We develop a new methodology to estimate the importance of herd behavior in financial markets. We build a structural model of informational herding that can be estimated with financial transaction data. In the model, rational herd behavior arises because of informationevent uncertainty. We estimate the model using transaction data on a NYSE stock (Ashland Inc.) during 1995. We then detect the periods in the trading days in which herd behavior occurs. Herd behavior often arises and is particularly pervasive in some days. The proportion of herd buyers (sellers) is 2% (4%) and is greater than 10% in 7% (11%) of information-event days. Herd behavior causes important informational inefficiencies: on average, the distance of the price from the one that would have prevailed had traders not herded is 4% of the expected asset value.
Introduction
1 We only study informational herding. Therefore, we do not discuss herd behavior due to reputational concerns or payoff externalities. For an early critical assessment of the literature on herd behavior see Gale (1996) . For recent surveys of herding in financial markets see Bikhchandani and Sharma (2001) , Vives (2008) and Hirshleifer and Teoh (2009). identify the mechanisms through which herd behavior can arise, the empirical literature has followed a different track. The existing work (see, e.g., Lakonishok et al., 1992; Grinblatt et al. , 1995; and Wermers, 1999) does not test the theoretical herding models directly, but analyzes the presence of herding in financial markets through statistical measures of clustering. 2 These papers find that in some markets fund managers tend to cluster their investment decisions more than if they acted independently. This empirical research on herding is important, as it sheds light on the behavior of financial market participants and in particular on whether they act in a coordinated fashion. As the authors themselves emphasize, however, decision clustering may or may not be due to herding (for instance, it may be the result of a common reaction to public announcements). These papers cannot distinguish spurious herding from true herd behavior, that is, the decision to disregard one's private information to follow the behavior of others (see Bikhchandani and Sharma, 2001; and Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2009 ).
Testing models of informational herd behavior is difficult. In these models, a trader herds if he trades against his own private information. The problem that empiricists face is that there are no data on the private information available to the traders and, therefore, it is difficult to understand whether traders decide not to follow it. Our purpose is to present an methodology to overcome this problem. We develop a theoretical model of herding and estimate it using financial market transaction data. We are able to identify the periods in the trading day in which traders act as herders and to measure the informational inefficiency that this generates. This is the first paper on informational herding that, instead of using a statistical, a-theoretical approach, brings a theoretical social learning model to the field data. 3 Our theoretical analysis builds on the work of Avery and Zemsky (1998) , who use a sequential trading modelà la Glosten and Milgrom (1985) to show the conditions under which herding can arise in financial markets. They show that, if the only source of uncertainty is the asset's fundamental value, traders will always find it optimal to trade on the difference between their own information (the history of trades and the private signal) and the commonly available information (the history only). Therefore, it will never be the case that agents neglect their information to imitate previous traders' decisions (and herd) . In contrast, when there are multiple sources of asymmetric information between the traders and the market maker (e.g., asymmetric information on the asset's volatility) herd behavior may arise. 4 In our model, herding arises for a mechanism similar to that exposed by Avery and Zemsky (1998) . However, whereas they were interested in providing theoretical examples of herding, our aim is to provide an empirical methodology to gauge the importance of herding in actual financial markets. For this purpose, we build a model of herding that can be estimated with financial market transaction data. In the model, an asset is traded over many days; at the beginning of each day, an informational event may occur, in which case the fundamental asset value changes with respect to the previous day. If an informational event has occurred, some traders receive private information on the new asset value. 5 These traders trade the asset to exploit their informational advantage on the market maker. In contrast, if no event has occurred, all traders in the market are noise, that is, they trade for non-information reasons only (liquidity or hedging motives). Whereas the informed traders know that they are in a market with private information (since they themselves are informed), the market maker does not. This asymmetry of information between the traders and the market maker implies that the market maker moves the price too "slowly" in order to take into account the possibility that the asset value may have not changed (in which case all trading activity is due to non-informational motives). As a result, after, for instance, a history of buys, a trader, even with a bad signal, may value the asset more than the market maker does. He will, therefore, trade against his own private information and herd buy.
We estimate the model with stock market transaction data via maximum likelihood, using a strategy first proposed by Easley et al. (1997) . They show how to use transaction data to estimate the parameters of the Glosten and Milgrom (1985) model. There is an important difference, however, between their methodology and ours. In their set up, informed traders are perfectly informed about the value of the asset; as a result, the traders' decisions are never affected by the decisions of the previous traders, and they never herd. Therefore, only the total number of buys, sells and no trades in each day matters; the sequence in which these trades arrives is irrelevant. In contrast, in our framework, the precision of private information is one of the parameters that we estimate. This opens the possibility that informed traders may receive noisy signals, and that they may find it optimal to ignore them and engage in herd behavior. In this circumstance, the sequence by which trades arrive in the market does matter: in contrast to Easley et. al.
(1997), we cannot estimate our model only from the number of buy or sell orders in a given day, but we must consider the whole history of trading activity in each day of trading.
As an illustration of the methodology, we estimate the model using transaction data on a NYSE stock (Ashland Inc.) during 1995. The restriction that private signals are perfectly precise is rejected by the data, which implies both that herd behavior arises in equilibrium and that there is information content in the sequence of trades. In particular, we find that informed traders receive incorrect information 40% of the time.
This has important consequences on the estimates of trading informativeness. A large literature has studied the information content of the trading activity using a measure (i.e., the PIN) based on the Easley et. al. (1997) methodology. Using that methodology, the measure of information-based activity in our sample would be 9%. Using our methodology, instead, we obtain 19%. The difference is due to the fact that in the previous literature incorrect trades (e.g., sell in a good-event day) can only be due to exogenous, non-informative (e.g., liquidity) reasons, whereas in our setup we do not exclude that they may be due to informed traders who either receive the incorrect information or herd.
Given our estimated parameters, we study how the traders' beliefs evolve during each day of trading. By comparing these beliefs to the prices, we are able to detect the periods of the trading day in which traders herd, and find that in most of the trading periods, a positive (albeit small) measure of informed traders herd. In an information-event day, on average, between 2% (4%) of informed traders herd buy (sell).
Herd behavior generates serial dependence in trading pattern, a phenomenon documented in the empirical literature. Herding also causes informational inefficiencies in the market. On average, the misalignement between the price we observe and that we would observe in the absence of herding is equal to 4% of the asset unconditional fundamental value.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the theoretical model. Section 3 presents the likelihood function. Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 presents the parameter estimates. Section 6 describes herding behavior and discusses informational inefficiency, and Section 7 concludes. An Appendix contains the proofs.
The Model
Following Easley and O'Hara (1987), we generalize the original Glosten and Milgrom (1985) model to an economy where trading happens over many days.
An asset is traded by a sequence of traders who interact with a market maker. Trade occurs over many trading days, indexed by d = 1, 2, 3, ....Time within each day is discrete and indexed by t = 1, 2, 3, ....
The asset
We denote the fundamental value of the asset in day d by V d . The asset value does not change during the day, but can change from one day to the other. At the beginning of the day, with probability 1 − α the asset value remains the same as in the previous day (V d = v d−1 ), and with probability α it changes. 6 In this case, since, as we will see, there are informed traders in the market, we say that an information event has occurred. If an information event occurs, with probability 1 − δ the asset value decreases to v d−1 − λ L ("bad informational event"), and with probability δ it increases to v d−1 + λ H ("good informational event"), where λ L > 0 and λ H > 0. Informational events are independently distributed over the days of trading. To simplify the notation, we define v
H , which, as will become clear in the next pages, guarantees that the closing price is a martingale.
The market The asset is exchanged in a specialist market. Its price is set by a market maker who interacts with a sequence of traders. At any time t = 1, 2, 3...during the day a trader is randomly chosen to act and can buy, sell or decide not to trade. Each trade consists of the exchange of one unit of the asset for cash. The trader's action space is, therefore, A ={buy, sell, no trade}. We denote the action of the trader at time t in day d by X The market maker At any time t of day d, the market maker sets the prices at which a trader can buy or sell the asset. When posting these prices, he must take into account the possibility of trading with traders who (as we shall see) have some private information on the asset value. He will set different prices for buying and for selling, that is, there will be a bid-ask spread (Glosten and Milgrom, 1985) . We denote the ask price (the price at which a trader can buy) at time t by a Due to unmodeled potential competition, the market maker makes zero expected profits by setting the ask and bid prices equal to the expected value of the asset conditional on the information available at time t and on the chosen action, that is,
The traders There are a countable number of traders. Traders act in an exogenous sequential order. Each trader is chosen to take an action only once, at time t of day d. Traders are of two types, informed and noise. The trader's own type is private information.
In no-event days, all traders in the market are noise. In contrast, in information-event days, at any time t an informed trader is chosen to trade with probability µ and a noise trader with probability 1 − µ, with µ ∈ (0, 1).
Noise traders trade for unmodeled (e.g., liquidity) reasons: they buy with probability ε 2 , sell with probability ε 2 and do not trade with probability 1 − ε (with 0 < ε < 1). Informed traders have private information on the asset value. They receive a private signal on the new asset value and observe the previous history of trades and prices, and the current prices. The private signal S d t has the following value-contingent densities: 
] for g L (in order for the density functions to integrate to one). Note that, given the value of the asset, the signals S 
is higher than that before receiving the signal if s The parameter τ measures the informativeness of the signals. When τ −→ 0, the densities are uniform and the signals are completely uninformative. As τ increases, the signals become more and more informative. For τ ∈ [0, 1), the support of the distribution of the likelihood ratio is bounded away from 0 and infinity, while for τ ≥ 1 it is not. Following Smith and Sørensen (2000) , in the first case we say that beliefs are bounded, and in the second case, that they are unbounded. With bounded beliefs, no signal realizations (even the most extreme ones) reveal the asset value with probability one. With unbounded beliefs, in contrast, some high (low) signal realizations are only possible when the asset value is high (low), and therefore, the signal can be perfectly informative. 7 As τ tends to infinity, the measure of perfectly informative signals tends to one.
An informed trader knows that an information event has occurred, and 7 In particular, any signal greater than or equal to τ +1 2τ reveals that the asset value is v that, as a result the asset value has changed with respect to the previous day. Moreover, his signal is informative on whether the event is good or bad. Nevertheless, according to the signal realization that he receives and to the precision τ , he may not be completely sure of the effect of the event on the asset value. For instance, he may know that there has been a change in the investment strategy of a company, but not be sure of whether this change will affect the asset value in a positive or negative way. The parameter τ can be interpreted as measuring the precision of the information that the trader receives, or the ability of the trader to process such private information. Finally, note that, given our signal structure, informed traders are heterogenous, since they receive signal realizations with different degrees of informativeness about the asset fundamental value. An informed trader's payoff function, U : {v with more informative signals (close to the extremes of the support) will not. We are interested in periods of the trading day in which traders engage in herd behavior for at least some signal realizations. At any given time t, we can detect whether an informed trader herds for a positive measure of signals by comparing the two thresholds σ The reason why herd behavior arise is that prices move "too slowly" as buy and sell orders arrive in the market. Suppose that, at the beginning of an information-event day, there is a sequence of buy orders. Informed traders, knowing that there has been an information event, attach a certain probability to the fact that these orders come from informed traders with good signals. The market maker, however, attaches a lower probability to this event, as he takes into account the possibility that there was no event, and that all the buys came from noise traders. Therefore, after a sequence of buys, he will update the prices up, but by less than the movement in traders' expectations. Because traders and market maker interpret the history of trades differently, the expectation of a trader with a bad signal may be higher than the ask price, in which case he herd buys. Obviously, traders who receive signals close to 0.5 will be more likely to herd, since the history of trades has more weight in forming their beliefs. We state this result in the next proposition:
Proposition For any finite τ , herd behavior arises with positive probability. Furthermore, herd behavior can be misdirected, that is, an informed trader can engage in herd buy (sell) in a day of bad (good) information event.
Proof See the Appendix.
Avery and Zemsky (1998) have shown how herding can arise because of uncertainty on whether an information event has occurred (see their IS2 information setup). In our model herding arises for the same reason. Our contribution is to embed this theoretical reason to herd in a model that is suitable to empirical analysis.
When τ > 1, extreme signals reveal the true value of the asset, and traders receiving them never herd. In the limit case of τ tending to infinity, all signal realizations become perfectly informative, with the result that no informed trader herds. Therefore, while our model allows for herd behavior, it also allows for the possibility that some traders (when τ > 1) or all traders (when τ −→ ∞) only rely on their private information and never herd.
The probability of herding depends on the parameter values. To take an extreme example, when α is arbitrarily close to zero, the market maker has a very strong prior that there is no information event. He barely updates the prices as trades arrive in the market, and herding arises as soon there is an imbalance in the order flow, as it happens in the seminal model of Bikhchandani et al. (1992) . In contrast, if α is close to 1, the market maker and the informed traders update their beliefs in very similar manners, and herding rarely occurs.
Herding is important also for the informational efficiency of the market. During periods of herd behavior, private information is aggregated less efficiently by the price as informed traders with good and bad signals may take the same action. The most extreme case is when traders herd for all signal realizations (e.g., traders herd buy even for s d t = 0). In such a case, the market maker is unable to make any inference on the signal realization from the trades. The market maker, however, updates his belief on the asset value, since the action remains informative on whether an information event has occurred or not. 10 Since the market maker never stops learning, he gradually starts interpreting the history of past trades more and more similarly to the traders and, as a result, the measure of herders shrinks.
During an information-event day, the measure of herders changes with the sequence of trades, and can become positive more than once at different times of the day. Given that information always flows to the market, however, the bid and ask prices converge to the asset value almost surely.
11 Eventually the market maker learns whether a good, bad or no event occurred. 12 10 The market maker learns since in periods of herding, the proportion of buys and sells is different from that in an uninformed day. Essentially, whereas in our model there is herd behavior, there is never an informational cascade. 11 The proof of convergence is standard and we omit it. 12 Recall that we have assumed that
Since the price converges to the fundamental value almost surely, this guarantees that the martingale property of prices is satisfied.
The Likelihood Function
To estimate the herding model presented above, we have to specify its likelihood function. Let us denote the history of trades at the end of a trading day by
, where T d is the number of trading dates in day d. We denote the likelihood function by
|Φ , where Φ := {α, δ, µ, τ, ε} is the vector of parameters.
Note that we write the likelihood function for the history of trades only, disregarding bid and ask prices. In our model there is no public information: for this reason, there is a one-to-one mapping from trades to prices, and adding prices would be redundant.
The one-to-one mapping from trades to prices breaks down in the presence of public information, since price changes may be the result of public information arrival (as opposed to being only determined by the order flow). Nevertheless, our likelihood function for the history of trades would still be correctly specified. The reason is that the probability of any given trade only depends on whether the trader is informed, and, in such a case, on whether his belief is higher or lower than the market maker's; neither event is affected by the arrival of public information (since this would affect traders' and market maker's beliefs in the same way, shifting all beliefs by the same amount).
Remember that information events are assumed to be independent. Moreover, the probability of the sequence of trades in a day only depends on the value of the asset that day. For this reason, the likelihood of a history of trades over multiple days can be written as the product of the likelihoods of the histories of trades for each day:
Let us focus on the probability of a history of trades in a single day. As we have written, the sequence of trades, and not just the number of trades, conveys information. Having many buy orders at the beginning of the day is not equivalent to having the same number of buy orders spread out during the day. In fact, a particular sequence of buy or sell orders may create herd behavior: in periods of herding, the probability of a trade depends on the measure of informed traders who herd and is different from the probability in the absence of herding. Therefore, we have to compute the probability of a history of trades recursively, that is,
or, after some manipulations, as
The probabilities in this equation can easily be expressed as a function of the traders' and market maker's beliefs a time t − 1 and of the parameters. (See the Appendix for further details.) 13 Note that for simplicity's sake in the probabilities to compute the ask we have omitted a 
. This is important, since it implies that we do not need to estimate the magnitude of the shocks that hit the asset value.
Note that at time t = 1, the prior beliefs of the traders and of the market maker are a function of the parameters only. Therefore, we can easily compute β
14 We do so recursively for each time t, always conditioning on the previous history of trades.
From β d t , we can compute the probability of a buy order in a good-event day. For the sake of exposition, let us focus on the case in which τ ∈ [0, 1), that is, let us concentrate on the case of bounded beliefs. In this case:
We use a similar procedure to compute the probability of a sell, that is,
Finally, the probability of a no trade is simply the complementary to the probabilities of a buy and a sell.
The analysis for the case of a bad information event (V d = v 
These can also be computed recursively by using Bayes's rule. This completes the description of the likelihood function.
14 To update the belief of traders and market maker after x d 1 we also need to know how to compute the probability of a sell and of a no trade, which we discuss below.
To conclude, let us give an intuition of how the model is identified. For simplicity's sake let us consider only the number of buys, sells and no trades in each day. 15 Similarly to analogous structural models of market microstructure, our model classifies days into high-volume days with a prevalence of buys ("good event" days), high-volume days with a prevalence of sells ("bad event" days) and low-volume days ("no event" days). The parameter α defines the probability that there is an event at the beginning of a trading day. We use data over many days of trading to identify it. The direction of the imbalance in the event days identifies δ. No-event days allow us to identify ε, since in no-event days only noise traders trade. Finally, in good event days, the ratio between buys and sells is determined by the proportion of traders who trade in the right direction (i.e., buy when the there is a good event), which depends on µ and τ . An analogous argument holds for badevent days. To any given estimate of µ and τ corresponds only one predicted ratio between buys and sells in the two types of days. 16 
Data
The aim of our study is mainly methodological. We are not trying to gauge the importance of herding across different stocks or different markets. Our goal is to develop a methodology to carry out a structural estimation of herding based on a market microstructure model. For this reason, we performed our empirical analysis on a single stock that had been studied before. Our choice fell on Ashland Inc., a stock traded in the New York Stock Exchange and used in Easley et al., 1997. 17 We obtained the data from the TAQ (Trades and Quotes) dataset. 18 The dataset reports a complete listing of the posted bid and ask prices (the "quotes"), the prices at which the transactions occurred (the "trades"), and the time when the quotes were posted or the transactions occurred. We use transactions data on Ashland Inc. in 1995, for a total of 252 trading days. The data refer to trading in the New York Stock Exchange, the American Stock Exchanges, and the consolidated 15 In our estimation we use much more information than that, since we take into account the entire sequence of trades when constructing the likelihood function. 16 For a further argument for identification, see footnote 21. 17 The name of the stock is slightly different, since the company changed name in 1995, and Easley et al. (1997) use 1990 data. 18 Hasbrouck (2004) provides a detailed description of this dataset.
regional exchanges. The TAQ dataset does not sign the trades, that is, does not report whether a transaction was a sale or a purchase. To classify a trade as a sell or a buy order, we used the standard algorithm proposed by Lee and Ready (1991) . We compared the transaction price with the quotes that were posted just before a trade occurred. 19 Every trade above the midpoint was classified as a buy order, and every trade below the midpoint was classified as a sell order; trades at the midpoint were classified as a buy or a sell order according to whether the transaction price had increased (uptick) or decreased (downtick) with respect to the previous one. If there was no change in the transaction price, we looked at the previous price movement and so on. Moreover, TAQ data do not contain any direct information on no trades. We used the established convention of inserting no-trades between two transactions if the time elapsed between them was longer than a particular time interval (see, e.g., Easley et al., 1997). Specifically, we obtained this interval by computing the ratio between the total trading time in a day and the average number of buy and sell trades over the 252 days (see, e.g., Chung et al., 2004). In our 252 trading day window, the average number of trades per day was 90.2. We divided the total daily trading time (390 minutes) by 90.2, and obtained a unit-time interval of 259 seconds (i.e., on average, a trade occurred every 259 seconds). If there was not any trading activity for 259 seconds or more, we added one or more no trades to the sequence of buy and sell orders. The number of no-trades that we added between two consecutive transactions was equal to the number of 259-seconds time intervals elapsing between them. Finally, to check the robustness of our results, we also replicated the analysis for other no-trade time intervals (2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 minutes).
Our sample of 252 trading days contained on average 149 decisions (either a buy, or a sell or a no-trade) per day. The sample was balanced, with 30% of buys, 31% of sells and 40% of no-trades.
Results
In presenting the results, we first show the estimates of the model parameters, and then illustrate the importance of herd behavior in the trading activity.
Estimates
We estimated the parameters through maximum likelihood. We used both a direct search method (Nelder-Mead simplex) and the Genetic Algorithm.
21
The two methods converged to the same parameter values. Table 1 Information events are relatively frequent: from the estimate of α, we infer that the probability of an information event is 28%, that is, in almost a third of trading days trading activity is motivated by private information. There is a small imbalance between good and bad-event days: the probability of a good information event is 62% (although the parameter has a relatively high standard deviation). 23 During event days, the proportion of traders with private information is 42%. The remaining trading activity comes from noise traders, who trade 57% of the time. Moreover, private information is noisy (that is, it is not perfectly informative). The estimate for τ is 0.45, which means that the probability of receiving an "incorrect signal" -i.e., a signal below 0.5 when we are in a good-information event day or a signal above 0.5 when we are in a bad-information event day -is 39%.
24
As we explained above, we constructed our dataset adding a no-trade each 259 seconds of trading inactivity. As a robustness check, we repeated the estimation on several other datasets, where we added a no trade for different intervals of trading inactivity. We report these estimates in Table  2 . The last two rows report two more statistics derived from the estimated parameters and explained in the text.
The estimates of the probability of an information event (α) and of a good in an good event day), whereas in only 12% of days the posterior belief of alpha is above 0.5 and that of delta is below 0.5 (i.e., we are in a bad event day). 24 Given the signal density functions, the probability of an incorrect signal is given by 0.5 − 0.25τ . event (δ) are fairly similar over the different numbers of seconds defining a no-trade interval. The estimate of ε increases with the the no-trade interval: this is expected since the number of no-trades in the sample (and also in the no-event days) become smaller and smaller. To have a better description of the trading activity in no-event days, we computed the probability of observing at least one trade during a 5-minute interval in a no-event day:
Seconds (where "Seconds" is the no-trade interval). Table 2 shows this probability to be independent of the choice of the no-trade interval.
The parameter µ is quite stable across samples, whereas τ increases. To understand this, it is useful to observe that if both τ and µ were constant, as ε increases the estimated proportion of trading activity due to traders not having correct information (either because they are noise or because their signal is incorrect) would increase. In contrast, this proportion should obviously be independent of our choice of no-trade interval. This is indeed the case. To show this we computed the parameter
which represents the proportion of correctly informed traders (e.g., informed traders with a signal greater than 0.5 in a good-event day) over the sum of all informed traders and the noise traders who trade. In other words, Γ is approximately equal to the fraction of trades coming from informed traders with the correct signal. 25 It is remarkable that Γ, which equals 0.34 when the no-trade interval is 259, is constant across all the different dataset that we used to estimate the model's parameters. This shows the robustness of our results to the choice of the no-trade interval.
Let us now discuss how our results compare to different specifications of the model. A natural comparison is with a model in which the signal precision is not estimated, but is restricted to be perfectly informative (i.e., τ −→ ∞). This is the case studied by Easley et al. (1997) . In this case, all informed traders follow their own private information, the sequence of trades has no informational content beyond the aggregate numbers of buys, sells and no trades, and herding never arises. As a result, the likelihood function does not need to be computed recursively (see Easley et al. (1997) for a detailed description). The estimates for α and δ are very close to those we obtain for our model. This shows that the classification of days is not affected by the specification of the signal structure. Similarly, the estimates for ε in the two models are almost the same. This is not surprising since ε captures the trading activity of noise traders, and is not affected by assumptions on the structure of private information. The parameter µ is instead quite smaller in the restricted model, which is intuitive, since in this model it is imposed that informed traders all receive the correct signal (i.e., they know whether a good or a bad information event occurred).
We can test whether the restriction in Easley et al. 26 This is important for our aims, since the fact that signals are not perfectly informative implies that the sequence in the order flow matters. In other words, the number of buys, sells and no trades at the end of the day is not a sufficient statistics for the pattern of trading activity. Depending on the sequence, herd behavior by informed traders may occur in equilibrium.
In the market microstructure literature, a great deal of attention has been given to the PIN, a measure of the probability that a trade comes from an informed trader (see, among others, Easley et al. (1996) and the literature cited in Chung et al. (2005) ). This measure is given by PIN= αµ αµ+ε (1−αµ) , where the numerator is the beginning-of-the-day probability that a trade is information based and the denominator is the probability that a trade occurs. With the estimated parameters of our model, the PIN equals 19%, whereas if we compute it for the Easley et al. (1997) model, it is only 9%.
27
If we adjust for the fact that in our model the information may not be correct (i.e., we multiply the numerator by the probability of a correct signal 0.5 + 0.25τ ), the measures of information-based trading given by the two models become almost the same. Since the null that the signal is perfectly precise is rejected by the data, our results suggest that the PIN, as usually computed, measures the proportion of informed-based trading coming from traders receiving the correct information and not the overall proportion of information-based trading. Essentially, the difference is due to the fact that in the previous literature incorrect trades (e.g., sell in a good-event day) can only be due to exogenous, non-informative (e.g., liquidity) reasons to trade, whereas in our setup we do not exclude that they may come from informed traders who either receive the incorrect information or herd.
To conclude, note that a 99% confidence interval for τ does not include 1.
28 This means that there is evidence in our sample that there are no realizations of the signal that reveal the true asset value with probability one. In the jargon of the social learning literature, signals are bounded.
Herd Behavior
The estimates of the parameters α and τ imply that herd behavior can occur in our sample. Since the estimate of α is clearly lower than 1, 29 there is information uncertainty in the market, which is a necessary condition for the mechanism of herd behavior highlighted in Section 2 to work. Moreover, the estimate τ = 0.44 means that traders receive a signal that is noisy (i.e., not perfectly informative) and may decide to act against it (i.e., buy upon receiving a bad signal or sell upon receiving a good one). 27 We compute the PIN for our model using the same formula as Easley et al. (1996) . They interpret the PIN as the probability of a trade coming from an informed trader at the beginning of the day. In our model, since the signal is continous, the interpretation is correct only if we ignore the bid-ask spread (otherwise, some informed traders may decide not to trade because their expectations fall inside the bid-ask spread.) We use this approximation for simpliciy's sake and to keep comparability with the existing work on the PIN. 28 Since the parameter's standard deviation is 0.02, this is the case for any reasonable confidence interval. 29 The parameter's standard deviation is 0.03. See the argument in the previous footnote. 
The Frequency of Herding
Recall that there is herd behavior at time t of day d when there is a positive measure of signal realizations for which an informed trader either herd buys or herd sells, that is, when, in equilibrium, either β d t < 0.5 (herd buy) or σ d t > 0.5 (herd sell). To gauge the frequency of herd behavior in our sample, for each trading day we computed the buy thresholds (β d t ) and the sell thresholds (σ d t ) given our parameter estimates. As an illustration, Figure 5 shows the thresholds for one day out of the 252 days in the sample. Whenever the buy threshold (dotted line) drops below 0.5 or the sell threshold (solid line) goes above 0.5, there is herd behavior. The shaded area represents the trade imbalance, that is, the number of buys minus the number of sells until the period before (measured on the vertical axis on the left). As one can see, herd buying occurs at the beginning of trading activity, as the trade imbalance is positive, that is, as more buy orders arrive in the market. This is followed by a long stretch of herd sells, as sell orders arrive and the trade imbalance becomes negative. At the very end of the day, herd behavior effectively disappears.
In this section we look at the frequency of herding, asking how often the buy threshold is below 0.5, or the sell threshold is above 0.5. It should be clear that this analysis is relevant both for event and no-event days. In both cases, the existence of signal realizations for which informed traders herd (if an information event has occurred -which neither the market maker nor an external observer knows at the moment of the trade) modifies the way the market maker updates the price, which, as we shall see, affects the market informational efficiency.
In our sample, herding happens quite frequently: over the 252 days of trading, in 30% of trading periods β d t is below 0.5, and in 37% of trading periods σ d t is above 0.5. Moreover, there are some days where herding is very pronounced. Table 4 reports the proportion of days in which the buy or sell thresholds β The table shows the mean, the standard deviation and the maximum for the number of consecutive trading periods in which there was herd behavior. The last row shows the mean trading period in which herd behavior occurred. Table 5 reports the mean period of the day when we observed herding, that is, approximately the 60 th trading period for both herd buy and herd sell (which, in clock time, is roughly after 2 hours and 36 minutes of trading).
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It is also interesting to ask how long periods of herding last, that is, for how many trading periods after a herd starts we observe a positive measure of herders. Herd buys last on average 9 trading periods (corresponding to about 24 minutes) and herd sells last on average for 10 periods. There is, however, pronounced variability in the length of herds, with a standard deviation of 13 and 15 trading periods. The longest herd buy lasted for 99 periods (about 257 minutes) and the longest herd sell lasted 120 periods (312 minutes).
Proportion of Herders
The previous analysis helps us gauge how often herding occurs in our sample.
The fact that at a given time the buy (sell) threshold is lower (higher) than 0.5, however, does not tell us how likely it is for an informed traders to herd at that time. This is captured by the measure of signal realizations for which an informed trader herds. As we will discuss in detail in the next subsection, this measure is also very important for the informational efficiency of the market. The higher the measure of signal realizations for which traders herd, the lower the informational efficiency.
To compute the measure of herd-signal realizations, however, we need to know the distribution of signals in any given day. This, in turn, depends on whether the day of trading was a good-event or a bad-event day. To this purpose, we classified a day as a good-event day (bad-event day) if two conditions hold: a) Pr(
. That is, we classified a day as a good (bad) event day if at the end of the day, the posterior probabilities of an information event occurring, and of the event being good (bad) were both higher than 0.9.
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We concentrated our analysis on the days classified as good-event or badevent days. For each trading period, we computed the proportion of bad signals for which informed traders would herd buy, and, similarly, the proportion of good signals for which informed traders would herd sell. Let us consider, for instance, a good-event day. In such a day, the signal is distributed according to g H (s , all signals for which the informed trader could potentially herd buy). We refer to this ratio as the "proportion of herders," since it shows the proportion of informed traders who would herd buy or herd sell were they to trade in that period. We report the average results in Tables 6 and 7 On average, across all event days, the proportion of buy herders was 2% and that of sell herders 4%. This proportion is, however, quite variable across days, reaching a maximum of 11% for herd buy and 29% for herd sell. Misdirected herding (i.e., herd buying in a bad-event day and herd selling in a good-event day) does occur: on average, in a bad-event day the proportion of herd buyers was 1%; in a good-event day, the proportion of herd sellers was 2%.
As Table 7 shows, there are a substantial number of days where the percentage of herd buyers or sellers is significant: for instance, in 7% of event days, the proportion of informed traders who herd buy was higher than 10%; similarly, in 11% of event days, the proportion of informed traders who herd sell was higher than 10%. This confirms the result of the previous section that herding behavior seems to be particularly concentrated in some days of trading.
An important question is whether herding usually happens after buy or sell orders have accumulated in the market. Table 8 shows that this is actually the case. The first row of Table 8 reports the average level of the trade imbalance in periods of herd buy (i.e., when β d t < 0.5). The trade imbalance is on average positive both in good and in bad event days. This means that herd buy usually happens when there has been a preponderance of buys. Similarly, the second row of Table 8 shows that herd selling usually occurs when there has been a preponderance of sells. Obviously, by definition, herd buy increases the proportion of buys and herd sell increases the proportion of sells. Table 9 illustrates this point, by showing the frequency of buy and sell orders that we observe in periods of herd buy and herd sell and contrasting them with the overall frequencies. In good-event days, for instance, the overall frequency of buy orders is 43%. This frequency raises up to 48% when there is herd buying. It is important to remark that the results of Tables 8 and 9 taken together imply that higher positive (negative) levels of the trade imbalance increase the probability of a buy (sell) order. That is, herd behavior generates serial dependence in the trading pattern during the day. 
Good-Event Days Bad-Event Days
β d t < 0.5 9 3.5 σ d t > 0.5 −8.2 −12.9
Informational Inefficiency
In periods of herd behavior, a proportion of informed traders do not trade according to their private information; as a result, information is aggregated less efficiently by the price. It is easy to show, in fact, that trades convey the maximum amount of information when informed traders buy upon receiving a good signal and sell upon receiving a bad one. 33 In periods of herding, in contrast, traders may buy even with a bad signal or sell even with a good one.
To quantify the informational inefficiency caused by herding, we proceeded in the following way. We simulated the history of trades and prices over many days for our theoretical model, using our estimates as parameter values. We then compared the simulation results with two benchmarks that capture the price behavior in an informationally efficient market. In a first benchmark, we simulated the model forcing informed traders to buy (sell) upon a good (bad) signal. In other words, informed traders (irrationally) never herded and always followed their private information. As a second benchmark, we considered the case in which there is no information uncertainty, that is, the market maker knows whether there has been an informational event. As a result, he updates his beliefs (and prices) exactly as informed traders do, and, because of this, informed traders never herd. Essentially, in the first benchmark, the market is efficient because traders (irrationally) follow their signals; in the second, the market is efficient because the informational asymmetry between traders and market makers due to event uncertainty is eliminated. The difference between the two scenarios is caused by the bid and ask spread. When, in the first benchmark, we force informed traders to buy (sell) upon a good (bad) signal, we disregard not only the incentive to herd, but also that to abstain from trading (because a trader's expectation may fall within the bid-ask spread).
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We simulated the price paths for 100, 000 days of trading (with 149 trading periods per day) for our theoretical model and for the two benchmarks. Then, at each time t of any day d, we computed the distance (i.e., the absolute value of the difference) between the public belief E(V d |h d t ) in our model and that in the benchmark.
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In Table 10 , we present the average distance taken over all trading periods as a percentage of the expected value of the asset. For the first benchmark, we present the average distance both over all days and over informed days only. For the second benchmark, by construction, only the average distance over event days is meaningful.
No-Herd Benchmark
No Event Uncertainty Benchmark All Days Event Days Event Days 4% 10% 7% The table shows the proportion of days in which the average distance between the public belief in the model and that in the benchmarks is higher than 10, 15, or 20 percent of the expected asset value.
34 See previous footnote. 35 The public belief E(V d |h d t ) is always between the bid and ask prices. It is common in the literature to interpret it as the price (abstracting from the bid-ask spread).
The average distance between the prices in our model and in the first benchmark over all days amounts to 4% of the asset expected value. If we focus our attention on event days, the distance is higher (10%), since the imbalance between buys and sells causes herding to arise more often. The average distance between the public beliefs using the second benchmark is similar, equal to 7%. In Table 11 we repeated these computations for days in which herding was more pronounced. In 7% of days (20% of event days) the distance between the price and the non-herding price is greater 15%. This suggests that there are days when intraday herding affects the informational properties of the price in a very significant manner.
Conclusion
We have developed a theoretical model of herd behavior in financial markets amenable to structural estimation with transaction data. We have estimated the model using data for a NYSE stock (Ashland Inc.) in 1995. Using our estimates, we have detected the periods in each trading day in which informed traders herd. We have found that herding is present in the market and fairly pervasive in some trading days. Moreover, it generates important informational inefficiencies.
The main contribution of the paper is methodological: it provides an empirical strategy to analyze herding within a structural estimation framework. This contrasts with the existing empirical studies of herding, based on a-theoretical, statistical measures of trade clustering.
In future research, we plan to use our methodology to investigate the importance of herding for a large number of stocks, by analyzing how herding changes with the stock characteristics (e.g., large stocks versus small ones) and with the macroeconomic environment (e.g., crises versus tranquil periods). We also plan to contribute to the existing literature on information and asset pricing, both by studying whether our measure of market informativeness (which takes into account that information may not be perfectly precise) improves the performance of the information factor, and by seeing whether herding itself is a risk factor priced in the market.
Finally, we observe that whereas our interest was in learning in financial markets, in the future our methodology could be fruitfully used in fields other than financial economics. The voluminous and growing theoretical literature on social learning has been intensively tested in laboratory exper-iments. There is, however, a general acknowledgement that these models cannot be easily studied with field data, because we lack of data on private information. Our study shows how this problem can be overcome. Table 6 
Robustness checks for

